Is more capital the solution to the banking crisis?

Two insightful pieces in Business Standard dt January 29, one an editorial and another an article by well known economist Lawrence Summers, explained at length the implications arising out of the sub prime crisis. Because of securitization, it has become difficult to pinpoint where risks lie and how to measure them. Financial institutions are holding various credit instruments that are impaired but difficult to value. This is creating uncertainty and freezing new lending.

Under the current circumstances, investors have become extremely risk averse, except for a few vulture investors like Wilbur Ross, who are on the prowl for distressed assets. So the valuations of asset backed securities are likely to be understated. During such times of panic, capital can give banks more staying power. As Summers put it “More capital permits more recognition of impairments and makes asset transfers easier by increasing the number of potential purchasers. It is preferable for the economy that banks bloster their capital positions by diluting current owners than by shrinking their lending activities.”

How valid are these arguments? To start with, we must appreciate that there are broadly speaking, three ways to deal with risk. One is to revamp internal systems and processes. That means strengthening risk measurement and control mechanisms. Unfortunately, in today’s situation, it has become difficult to identify tainted assets, leave alone measure risk accurately. Moreover, if banks swing to the other extreme and auditors start taking control of banks, lending and trading may be further discouraged. That is the last thing the financial system needs today.

A second method is to use derivatives and transfer risk quickly, ie avoid warehousing. If the bank does not understand the risk well or is uncomfortable managing it actively, it should be transferred through a derivative or insurance contract. Indeed, this is what Goldman Sachs, the player virtually unaffected by the sub prime crisis seems to have done.

The last is to have more equity, another name for capital. When risks are very difficult to identify or measure and we are in a situation where we do not know what we do not know, capital is the only credible alternative. Citi, UBS and other leading banks have all tried to recapitalise themselves in recent months, approaching sovereign wealth funds in the middle east and Asia.

There is no doubt that capital is critically important for a bank. Richard Brealey, an eminent academic ( from London Business School) writing in the Journal of Applied Corporate Finance( Fall 2006 ) observed that If the value of bank assets evolved smoothly and could be observed continuously then a bank would need only a minimal amount of equity capital. But to deal with “jump” risks, extra capital is required . Moreover, many asset values are observed only at discrete intervals. The greater the time between valuations of the bank’s assets, and the more volatile those assets, the more capital that would be needed. Finally, capital provides a safeguard against errors in valuing the bank’s assets.

But as the Americans say, there is no free lunch. Capital comes at a price. So banks should not hold too much capital. Otherwise they will not be able to meet the expectations of shareholders. Moreover, capital may be of little help if there is a run on banks. After all, the amounts raised by the global banks from the sovereign wealth funds, despite the media publicity and political reactions it has attracted, is only a small fraction of the estimated total exposure of banks to asset backed securities.

If prudent risk management demands that banks should only hold those risks which they should hold, this is a great opportunity for soul searching and financial restructuring. In an insightful article in the Harvard Business Review, (Nov 2005), the Nobel prize winning Robert Merton had mentioned: “ In most large companies, equity capital is used to cushion against a great many risks that the firm is no better at bearing than anyone else. If it can strip out the non value adding or passive risk, a company will be able to use its existing equity capital to finance a lot more value adding assets and activities than competitors and its shares will be worth far more.”

Equity is also an expensive source of capital. It does not enjoy tax benefits. Moreover, there are agency costs associated with equity that favor managers over shareholders. Unlike debt, where there are mandatory cash outflows, equity can make managers complacent.

To avoid these agency costs, some economists have argued that banks should be obliged to make regular issues of subordinated debt. The holders of this subordinated debt would have the incentive to monitor the bank. At the same time, the prices at which the debt is issued will reflect the bank’s creditworthiness. True subordinated debt will not solve all corporate governance problems. But there is no doubt that higher discipline will result if banks have to go to the market to raise debt from time to time. And we must remember that market discipline is one of the three pillars of Basle II, the others being supervisory review and minimum capital requirements.

As the banking system finds itself at a cross roads, there is little doubt that regulators today face the onerous burden of coming up with the right policy response. Merely raising the capital adequacy ratio may not be enough.