Saturday, January 20, 2007

The Nationalization of the Suez Canal


[1]

My old interest in History was revived by a very insightful article which appeared in the Economist dt July 29, 2006. The article explained how the Suez canal was nationalized and the resultant fallouts.

On July 26th 1956, Gamal Abdul Nasser, president of Egypt, addressed a huge crowd in the city of Alexandria and instigated them against Britain. The colonial power had ruled Egypt from 1882 to 1922, when it gained independence, and continued to influence Egyptian affairs for several years till the monarchy was finally overthrown by Nasser in 1952.

During his speech, Nasser mentioned the name of the Frenchman who had built the canal, Ferdinand de Lesseps, several times. "De Lesseps", it turned out, later was the signal to the Egyptian army to start the seizure of the canal.
The Suez crisis resulted in a major humiliation for Britain and France. As America's supremacy over its Western allies became evident, European countries came together to create what is now the European Union. The crisis promoted pan-Arab nationalism and effectively transformed the Israeli-Palestinian dispute into an Israeli-Arab one.
Background Note
Britain had become such an unwanted guest in Egypt that by the early 1950s, Winston Churchill, (who had returned as prime minister in 1951) felt he could no longer resist the tide of nationalism. By June 1956, the last of the British soldiers had left. Yet Anglo-Egyptian relations did not improve.
Meanwhile, Nasser was also enraged by America's withdrawal of its offer of loans to help pay for the building of a dam on the Nile at Aswan. This project was central to his ambitions to modernize Egypt. But John Foster Dulles, the American secretary of state, thought the dam would place too much strain on the resources of newly independent Egypt. At the same time, the British, mistrustful of Nasser were also ready to withdraw their loan offer. Under the circumstances, Dulles thought the Russians would finally step in and assist Egypt. But in a surprising turn of events, Nasser nationalized the canal.
Britain and France reacted strongly, by getting ready for a military invasion of Egypt and a reoccupation of the canal zone. But they faced resistance from US President Eisenhower, who from the beginning was against the use of force by his two main allies. One concern for Eisenhower was the presidential election due that November, which he was contesting on the "peace" plank. Eisenhower was also motivated by anti-imperialist sentiments that had made the Americans break free from the British empire. Eisenhower also feared that, any bullying of Egypt by Western powers would alienate the Arabs and drive them towards the Russian camp.
In another turn of events, Israel provided a way out. Israel offered to invade Egypt and reach the canal. The French and British could then intervene, posing as peacekeepers to separate the two sides, and occupy the canal, ostensibly to guarantee the free passage of shipping. The details were finalized at a secret meeting near Paris.
On October 29th, Israeli paratroopers were dropped into Sinai to begin the invasion. The British and French promptly issued an ultimatum to both sides to cease fire. When the Egyptians did not budge, British planes started bombing the Egyptian air force on the ground. On November 5th, Anglo-French troops went ashore to invade the canal.
Eisenhower, who felt utterly betrayed by his erstwhile allies, was determined to put an end to the war. Presumably, at his instance, America refused to allow the IMF to give emergency loans to Britain unless it called off the invasion. Faced by imminent financial collapse, on November 7th, Britain surrendered to American demands and stopped the operation. The French were furious, but had to fall in line as their troops were under British command.
America also swung things in its favor at the UN. On 2nd November an American resolution demanding a ceasefire was passed by a majority of 64 to five. The Russians voted with the United States. As they say, circumstances make strange bedfellows! And to sidestep Anglo-French vetoes at the Security Council, the General Assembly met in emergency session and decided to assemble an international emergency force (a suggestion made by Canada) to go to the canal and monitor the ceasefire. Eisenhower won his election in America.
Implications
The French and soon the Germans realizing they were too small individually to deal with the Americans, took the lead in setting up the six-country European common market, which later became the European Union. The founding Treaty of Rome was signed the very next year, in 1957. The French kept the British out of it until 1973. France had by then made itself truly independent of American military power by building its own nuclear deterrent from scratch. In 1966, France also left NATO's integrated command structure. Meanwhile, the British decided to be content playing second fiddle to America unlike the French, who wanted to lead Europe.

The crisis affirmed America’s new status as the global superpower, challenged only by the Soviet Union. As Eisenhower had feared, the Russians moved into the Middle East to fill the gap left by the disorderly retreat of the British. So the Americans felt compelled to get in as well. Thus the cold war spread to North Africa and Egypt and Israel became ever more closely tied to the United States.

Before 1956, Israel had been morally and politically unassailable beyond the Arab world. The Israeli occupation of 1956 changed this perception, marking the country’s first expansion beyond its original borders. In 1956, the Israelis were quickly forced to withdraw by American (and Russian) pressure. But this was the last time an American president would speak out so forcefully against Israel.

Nasser emerged a clear winner in the short term. Before the crisis, he had faced opposition in Egypt, not only from the former ruling class but also from communists and radical Islamists. Encouraged by his success, Nasser launched misguided adventures such as a short-lived political union with Syria and nationalization of Egyptian industry. Nasser also triggered off a wave of pan-Arab nationalism across much of the Arab world. Though Nasser was largely discredited by Israel's crushing victory in the 1967 war, the institutions of Nasserism still lived on, in Egypt and elsewhere, as effective ways of maintaining political control and perpetuating autocratic regimes. Saddam Hussein also drew inspiration from Nasser.

References

1. “An affair to remember,” The Economist, 29th July 2006, pp 23-25.
[1] This article draws heavily from an article in The Economist, “An Affair to remember,” 29th July 2006, pp 23-25.

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