CREATIVITY - Flow and the psychology of discovery and invention by Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi
This fascinating book by Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi brings out the importance of creativity, outlines its building blocks and explains how we can all become more creative.
Without creativity, it would be difficult to distinguish humans from other animals. Creativity leads to a fuller, more satisfying life. Without creativity, mankind would not progress.
Csikszentmihalyi points out that creativity cannot be understood by looking only at the people who appear to make it happen. Creative ideas need a receptive audience to record and implement them. And without the assessment of competent outsiders, we cannot decide whether the claims of a self-styled creative person are valid.
Creativity results from the interaction of a system consisting of three elements: a culture that contains symbolic rules, a person who brings novelty into the symbolic domain, and a field of experts who recognize and validate the innovation.
Creativity is the process by which a symbolic domain in the culture is changed. So we must learn the domain well. To master a domain, we must pay attention to the information to be assimilated. Bulk of our attention is committed to the tasks of surviving from one day to the next. And we do not do much with the small amount of attention left over because of the lack of focus. Diffused thinking leads to lack of concentration. Creativity is possible only when we are able to focus attention on the problem at hand.
Creativity, as mentioned before, consists of three main parts. The first of these is the domain, which consists of a set of symbolic rules and procedures.
The second component of creativity is the field, which includes all the individuals who act as gatekeepers to the domain. They decide whether a new idea or product can be accepted. For example, in the visual arts, the field consists of art teachers, curators of museums, collectors of art, critics, and administrators of foundations and government agencies that deal with culture. These people decide what new works of art must be recognised, preserved, and remembered.
The third component is the individual, who using symbols of a given domain, comes up with a new idea or sees a new pattern. His or her thoughts or actions change a domain, or establish a new domain.
Read this book to get a deeper understanding of creativity and how creative people go about doing their work and leading their lives.
Friday, July 27, 2007
Thursday, July 26, 2007
The Mystery of Capital
Why does capitalism thrive in the west but not in many developing countries? Global capitalism has been tried before in various parts of the world. In Latin America, for example, reforms have been tried at least four times since independence from Spain in the 1820s. Each time, after the initial euphoria, Latin America swung back from capitalist and market economy policies.
Westerners rationalise these setbacks by blaming people in the poor countries for their lack of entrepreneurial spirit or market orientation. Other popular explanations are lack of Protestant ethic, the legacy of colonialism and low IQ.
According to Hernando De Soto, the major stumbling block that keeps the rest of the world from benefiting from capitalism is its inability to produce capital. Capital is the force that raises the productivity of labour and creates the wealth of nations. It is the lifeblood of the capitalist system, the foundation of progress, and the one thing that the poor countries of the world cannot seem to produce enough for themselves.
De Soto argues in this seminal book that the poor cannot produce capital not because they do not possess assets. But they hold these assets in defective forms: houses built on land whose ownership rights are not adequately recorded, or unincorporated businesses with undefined liability. Because the rights to these possessions are not adequately documented, these assets cannot readily be turned into capital, cannot be traded outside narrow local circles where people know and trust each other and cannot be used as collateral for a loan.
In the West, by contrast, land, building and equipment are represented in a property document that connects all these assets to the rest of the economy. Thanks to this representational process, land can be used as collateral for raising loans. Third World and former community nations do not have this representational process. The enterprises of the poor are very much like corporations that cannot issue shares or bonds to obtain new investments and finance.
In poor countries, although people frequently break the law, their entrepreneurial ingenuity has created wealth on a vast scale. These assets far exceed the holdings of the government, the local stock exchanges and foreign direct investment. According to the author, the total value of the “illegal” real estate held by the poor of the Third World and former communist nations is at least $9.3 trillion, about twice as much as the total circulating US money supply. But in the absence of a suitable representational process, the value of these assets remains locked up.
Read this great book to know more.
Westerners rationalise these setbacks by blaming people in the poor countries for their lack of entrepreneurial spirit or market orientation. Other popular explanations are lack of Protestant ethic, the legacy of colonialism and low IQ.
According to Hernando De Soto, the major stumbling block that keeps the rest of the world from benefiting from capitalism is its inability to produce capital. Capital is the force that raises the productivity of labour and creates the wealth of nations. It is the lifeblood of the capitalist system, the foundation of progress, and the one thing that the poor countries of the world cannot seem to produce enough for themselves.
De Soto argues in this seminal book that the poor cannot produce capital not because they do not possess assets. But they hold these assets in defective forms: houses built on land whose ownership rights are not adequately recorded, or unincorporated businesses with undefined liability. Because the rights to these possessions are not adequately documented, these assets cannot readily be turned into capital, cannot be traded outside narrow local circles where people know and trust each other and cannot be used as collateral for a loan.
In the West, by contrast, land, building and equipment are represented in a property document that connects all these assets to the rest of the economy. Thanks to this representational process, land can be used as collateral for raising loans. Third World and former community nations do not have this representational process. The enterprises of the poor are very much like corporations that cannot issue shares or bonds to obtain new investments and finance.
In poor countries, although people frequently break the law, their entrepreneurial ingenuity has created wealth on a vast scale. These assets far exceed the holdings of the government, the local stock exchanges and foreign direct investment. According to the author, the total value of the “illegal” real estate held by the poor of the Third World and former communist nations is at least $9.3 trillion, about twice as much as the total circulating US money supply. But in the absence of a suitable representational process, the value of these assets remains locked up.
Read this great book to know more.
The Wisdom of Crowds
In this best seller, James Surowiecki tell us how we can leverage the collective intelligence of a group of people as opposed to depending heavily on the individual brilliance of one or a few people. Surowiecki also examines situations when the judgment of a crowd can go awry. Many of the principles covered in the book can be used by companies profitably to improve decision making and managerial effectiveness.
Under the right circumstances, groups of people can be remarkably intelligent and often smarter than the smartest people in them. Even if most of the people in a group are not exceptionally well informed, they can still reach a collectively wise decision.The author’s key message is that instead of searching for one or a few experts to solve a problem, it might be better to tap the wisdom of the crowd.
The author deals with three kinds of problems in this book. Cognition problems are those which have definitive solutions. In case of coordination problems people in a group have to coordinate their behavior with each other. Cooperation problems involve getting self interested, distrustful people to work together. The author examines how the wisdom of crowds can be leveraged to deal with each of those problems.
Some real life examples illustrate the wisdom of crowds.We all know how effective the audience poll is in Kaun Banega Crorepati (KBC), whereas “phone a friend” often produces the wrong answer. We know this intuitively but more systematic studies have been done in the West. In the popular TV show, “Who wants to be a millionaire?” on which KBC is based, the experts gave the right answer 65% of the time but the audience did so 91% of the time.
The way Google works is also on the basis of the wisdom of crowds. Google is based on an algorithm that attempts to let all the web pages on the Internet decide which pages are relevant to a particular search. Google interprets a link from one page to another as a vote. Votes cast by pages, that are themselves more important, receive more weight.
We can view the stock market as a crowd. When the Space Shuttle, Challenger blew up on January 28, 1986, the stock markets hammered down the price of one of the four contractors involved in the project, Morton Thiokol. No public information was available to indicate that it was indeed this vendor who was the main culprit and not the other three. Yet, six months later, the presidential commission endorsed the view of the market by concluding that it was indeed the O-ring seals supplied by Thiokol that was responsible for the damage. There was no evidence of insider trading, i.e., the crowd did not have access to any privileged information. Yet the crowd had established its wisdom beyond doubt.
A mathematical truism forms the basis for the wisdom of crowds. When a large group of diverse, independent people estimate something, each estimate has two components, the expected value and the error. When the estimates are added, the errors cancel out. That is why when crowds figure out the expected value, the accuracy levels are often high.
A group works effectively because of diversity of opinion, independence (people think independently), decentralization (people draw on locally available knowledge) and aggregation (mechanism for turning private judgments into a collective decision).
At the same time, we must remember that groups work well only under certain circumstances but not under others. They need rules to maintain order and coherence. Communication within the group is important though excessive communication is not desirable. This means that people within the groups must not be able to influence each other too much.
Read this great book to know more.
Under the right circumstances, groups of people can be remarkably intelligent and often smarter than the smartest people in them. Even if most of the people in a group are not exceptionally well informed, they can still reach a collectively wise decision.The author’s key message is that instead of searching for one or a few experts to solve a problem, it might be better to tap the wisdom of the crowd.
The author deals with three kinds of problems in this book. Cognition problems are those which have definitive solutions. In case of coordination problems people in a group have to coordinate their behavior with each other. Cooperation problems involve getting self interested, distrustful people to work together. The author examines how the wisdom of crowds can be leveraged to deal with each of those problems.
Some real life examples illustrate the wisdom of crowds.We all know how effective the audience poll is in Kaun Banega Crorepati (KBC), whereas “phone a friend” often produces the wrong answer. We know this intuitively but more systematic studies have been done in the West. In the popular TV show, “Who wants to be a millionaire?” on which KBC is based, the experts gave the right answer 65% of the time but the audience did so 91% of the time.
The way Google works is also on the basis of the wisdom of crowds. Google is based on an algorithm that attempts to let all the web pages on the Internet decide which pages are relevant to a particular search. Google interprets a link from one page to another as a vote. Votes cast by pages, that are themselves more important, receive more weight.
We can view the stock market as a crowd. When the Space Shuttle, Challenger blew up on January 28, 1986, the stock markets hammered down the price of one of the four contractors involved in the project, Morton Thiokol. No public information was available to indicate that it was indeed this vendor who was the main culprit and not the other three. Yet, six months later, the presidential commission endorsed the view of the market by concluding that it was indeed the O-ring seals supplied by Thiokol that was responsible for the damage. There was no evidence of insider trading, i.e., the crowd did not have access to any privileged information. Yet the crowd had established its wisdom beyond doubt.
A mathematical truism forms the basis for the wisdom of crowds. When a large group of diverse, independent people estimate something, each estimate has two components, the expected value and the error. When the estimates are added, the errors cancel out. That is why when crowds figure out the expected value, the accuracy levels are often high.
A group works effectively because of diversity of opinion, independence (people think independently), decentralization (people draw on locally available knowledge) and aggregation (mechanism for turning private judgments into a collective decision).
At the same time, we must remember that groups work well only under certain circumstances but not under others. They need rules to maintain order and coherence. Communication within the group is important though excessive communication is not desirable. This means that people within the groups must not be able to influence each other too much.
Read this great book to know more.
Friday, February 02, 2007
Thursday, February 01, 2007
Thursday, January 25, 2007
How Private Equity Scores over Listed Capital
A recent report on “Executive Pay” in The Economist (20th January 2007) summarized how private equity scores over listed capital.
The boards are staffed by knowledgeable directors.
Directors are intensely involved. Their bonuses depend on company’s performance.
The focus is on a medium term goal of listing or selling a company that will fetch a good price.
The long-term cannot be used as an excuse for postponing tough action.
Managerial pay in private equity is attractive. But it is aligned with success or failure.
No wonder, there are thousands of private equity firms today managing billions of dollars of capital. The action is now spreading all over the world. Citigoup has announced it will set up a new $200 million fund dedicated to Africa. Many of the bigger players plan to increase their commitment to emerging markets in the next five years.
Sunday, January 21, 2007
Saturday, January 20, 2007
The Nationalization of the Suez Canal
[1]
My old interest in History was revived by a very insightful article which appeared in the Economist dt July 29, 2006. The article explained how the Suez canal was nationalized and the resultant fallouts.
On July 26th 1956, Gamal Abdul Nasser, president of Egypt, addressed a huge crowd in the city of Alexandria and instigated them against Britain. The colonial power had ruled Egypt from 1882 to 1922, when it gained independence, and continued to influence Egyptian affairs for several years till the monarchy was finally overthrown by Nasser in 1952.
During his speech, Nasser mentioned the name of the Frenchman who had built the canal, Ferdinand de Lesseps, several times. "De Lesseps", it turned out, later was the signal to the Egyptian army to start the seizure of the canal.
The Suez crisis resulted in a major humiliation for Britain and France. As America's supremacy over its Western allies became evident, European countries came together to create what is now the European Union. The crisis promoted pan-Arab nationalism and effectively transformed the Israeli-Palestinian dispute into an Israeli-Arab one.
Background Note
Britain had become such an unwanted guest in Egypt that by the early 1950s, Winston Churchill, (who had returned as prime minister in 1951) felt he could no longer resist the tide of nationalism. By June 1956, the last of the British soldiers had left. Yet Anglo-Egyptian relations did not improve.
Meanwhile, Nasser was also enraged by America's withdrawal of its offer of loans to help pay for the building of a dam on the Nile at Aswan. This project was central to his ambitions to modernize Egypt. But John Foster Dulles, the American secretary of state, thought the dam would place too much strain on the resources of newly independent Egypt. At the same time, the British, mistrustful of Nasser were also ready to withdraw their loan offer. Under the circumstances, Dulles thought the Russians would finally step in and assist Egypt. But in a surprising turn of events, Nasser nationalized the canal.
Britain and France reacted strongly, by getting ready for a military invasion of Egypt and a reoccupation of the canal zone. But they faced resistance from US President Eisenhower, who from the beginning was against the use of force by his two main allies. One concern for Eisenhower was the presidential election due that November, which he was contesting on the "peace" plank. Eisenhower was also motivated by anti-imperialist sentiments that had made the Americans break free from the British empire. Eisenhower also feared that, any bullying of Egypt by Western powers would alienate the Arabs and drive them towards the Russian camp.
In another turn of events, Israel provided a way out. Israel offered to invade Egypt and reach the canal. The French and British could then intervene, posing as peacekeepers to separate the two sides, and occupy the canal, ostensibly to guarantee the free passage of shipping. The details were finalized at a secret meeting near Paris.
On October 29th, Israeli paratroopers were dropped into Sinai to begin the invasion. The British and French promptly issued an ultimatum to both sides to cease fire. When the Egyptians did not budge, British planes started bombing the Egyptian air force on the ground. On November 5th, Anglo-French troops went ashore to invade the canal.
Eisenhower, who felt utterly betrayed by his erstwhile allies, was determined to put an end to the war. Presumably, at his instance, America refused to allow the IMF to give emergency loans to Britain unless it called off the invasion. Faced by imminent financial collapse, on November 7th, Britain surrendered to American demands and stopped the operation. The French were furious, but had to fall in line as their troops were under British command.
America also swung things in its favor at the UN. On 2nd November an American resolution demanding a ceasefire was passed by a majority of 64 to five. The Russians voted with the United States. As they say, circumstances make strange bedfellows! And to sidestep Anglo-French vetoes at the Security Council, the General Assembly met in emergency session and decided to assemble an international emergency force (a suggestion made by Canada) to go to the canal and monitor the ceasefire. Eisenhower won his election in America.
Implications
The French and soon the Germans realizing they were too small individually to deal with the Americans, took the lead in setting up the six-country European common market, which later became the European Union. The founding Treaty of Rome was signed the very next year, in 1957. The French kept the British out of it until 1973. France had by then made itself truly independent of American military power by building its own nuclear deterrent from scratch. In 1966, France also left NATO's integrated command structure. Meanwhile, the British decided to be content playing second fiddle to America unlike the French, who wanted to lead Europe.
The crisis affirmed America’s new status as the global superpower, challenged only by the Soviet Union. As Eisenhower had feared, the Russians moved into the Middle East to fill the gap left by the disorderly retreat of the British. So the Americans felt compelled to get in as well. Thus the cold war spread to North Africa and Egypt and Israel became ever more closely tied to the United States.
Before 1956, Israel had been morally and politically unassailable beyond the Arab world. The Israeli occupation of 1956 changed this perception, marking the country’s first expansion beyond its original borders. In 1956, the Israelis were quickly forced to withdraw by American (and Russian) pressure. But this was the last time an American president would speak out so forcefully against Israel.
Nasser emerged a clear winner in the short term. Before the crisis, he had faced opposition in Egypt, not only from the former ruling class but also from communists and radical Islamists. Encouraged by his success, Nasser launched misguided adventures such as a short-lived political union with Syria and nationalization of Egyptian industry. Nasser also triggered off a wave of pan-Arab nationalism across much of the Arab world. Though Nasser was largely discredited by Israel's crushing victory in the 1967 war, the institutions of Nasserism still lived on, in Egypt and elsewhere, as effective ways of maintaining political control and perpetuating autocratic regimes. Saddam Hussein also drew inspiration from Nasser.
References
1. “An affair to remember,” The Economist, 29th July 2006, pp 23-25.
[1] This article draws heavily from an article in The Economist, “An Affair to remember,” 29th July 2006, pp 23-25.
Mergers & Acquisitions in 2006
The pace of deal-making across the world has accelerated in recent months. Most M&As fail to create value for the acquirer's shareholders. However, today a growing body of evidence suggests that the continuing appetite for M&A can make sense. Not every deal will succeed but the probability of predicting which kind of deals will create value, has increased.
Deal-making has picked up momentum in Europe. In the United States, industries such as telecommunications and defence have already been consolidated and now contain only a few enormous companies. In Europe, only now is cross-border integration happening to the extent anticipated at the birth of the euro.
Private-equity firms seem to have understood the building blocks of a successful acquisition. Companies like Cisco and General Electric have also demonstrated that it is possible to add value through acquisitions by identifying targets carefully and planning the integration of each new acquisition well in advance.
GE spends billions of dollars a year buying companies. About 230 people work full-time in the team, roughly a quarter of them at head office and the remaining in GE's six main business units. GE has a systematic process for handling acquisitions. Regular reviews compare the performance of past acquisitions with the targets they were set. CEO Jeff Immelt is personally involved. No deal of more than $3m[1] is done without Immelt's approval. Deals are evaluated using both quantitative and qualitative criteria. GE plans the detailed integration of the target acquisition even as it is doing due diligence. When an acquisition fails, GE spends a lot of time trying to understand the reasons for the failure.
There are various signals by which one can judge whether a merger is going to add value. If the acquirer is paying in cash not shares, it shows more confidence. Paying with cash also puts pressure to produce results. Quite a few deals in the early part of 2006 were in cash. It is partly this use of cash that has raised expectations that these transactions will add value. Deals that facilitate global industry consolidation such as Mittal Steel's hostile $24 billion[2] bid for Arcelor, another steelmaker, also seem to have the potential to add value. On the other hand, grand mergers that promise synergies from combining unrelated businesses often fail to add value.
The circumstances make the current takeover boom appear more solid than at comparable times in the late 1990s. Companies in America and Europe have been through a long period of cost-cutting in the past 5 years. This has helped improve significantly both profits and cash flows, which can be used for either capital expenditure or acquisitions. Takeover premiums also have been modest. The difference between an offer price and the target company's previous share price is averaging around 20%, compared with 35-40% at the height of previous merger waves. Another reason for optimism is the cheap, plentiful debt that companies are able to use for deals, thereby lowering the cost of capital and increasing earnings per share.
Despite all this optimism, however, companies would do well to be careful before going ahead with a merger. The risks involved in a merger should never be underestimated.
References
“Learn as you churn,” The Economist, 8th April 2006, p72.
“Riding a wave,” The Economist, 8th April 2006, pp 18-19.
“Once more unto the breach, dear clients, once more,” The Economist, 8th April 2006, pp 71-72,
[1] “Learn as you churn,” The Economist, 8th April 2006, p72.
[2] “Riding a wave,” The Economist, 8th April 2006, pp 18-19.
Deal-making has picked up momentum in Europe. In the United States, industries such as telecommunications and defence have already been consolidated and now contain only a few enormous companies. In Europe, only now is cross-border integration happening to the extent anticipated at the birth of the euro.
Private-equity firms seem to have understood the building blocks of a successful acquisition. Companies like Cisco and General Electric have also demonstrated that it is possible to add value through acquisitions by identifying targets carefully and planning the integration of each new acquisition well in advance.
GE spends billions of dollars a year buying companies. About 230 people work full-time in the team, roughly a quarter of them at head office and the remaining in GE's six main business units. GE has a systematic process for handling acquisitions. Regular reviews compare the performance of past acquisitions with the targets they were set. CEO Jeff Immelt is personally involved. No deal of more than $3m[1] is done without Immelt's approval. Deals are evaluated using both quantitative and qualitative criteria. GE plans the detailed integration of the target acquisition even as it is doing due diligence. When an acquisition fails, GE spends a lot of time trying to understand the reasons for the failure.
There are various signals by which one can judge whether a merger is going to add value. If the acquirer is paying in cash not shares, it shows more confidence. Paying with cash also puts pressure to produce results. Quite a few deals in the early part of 2006 were in cash. It is partly this use of cash that has raised expectations that these transactions will add value. Deals that facilitate global industry consolidation such as Mittal Steel's hostile $24 billion[2] bid for Arcelor, another steelmaker, also seem to have the potential to add value. On the other hand, grand mergers that promise synergies from combining unrelated businesses often fail to add value.
The circumstances make the current takeover boom appear more solid than at comparable times in the late 1990s. Companies in America and Europe have been through a long period of cost-cutting in the past 5 years. This has helped improve significantly both profits and cash flows, which can be used for either capital expenditure or acquisitions. Takeover premiums also have been modest. The difference between an offer price and the target company's previous share price is averaging around 20%, compared with 35-40% at the height of previous merger waves. Another reason for optimism is the cheap, plentiful debt that companies are able to use for deals, thereby lowering the cost of capital and increasing earnings per share.
Despite all this optimism, however, companies would do well to be careful before going ahead with a merger. The risks involved in a merger should never be underestimated.
References
“Learn as you churn,” The Economist, 8th April 2006, p72.
“Riding a wave,” The Economist, 8th April 2006, pp 18-19.
“Once more unto the breach, dear clients, once more,” The Economist, 8th April 2006, pp 71-72,
[1] “Learn as you churn,” The Economist, 8th April 2006, p72.
[2] “Riding a wave,” The Economist, 8th April 2006, pp 18-19.
Hedge Funds in 2006
The hedge fund business has attracted a lot of attention in recent months. There are about 8,000 hedge funds today[1], with more than $1 trillion of assets under management. Most of these funds are clustered around a few centers like Connecticut and London.
What exactly is a hedge fund? According to Wikipedia, the term "Hedge Fund" is used to distinguish lightly regulated funds generally open to only a limited number of investors, from retail investment funds or Mutual funds, which are widely available to the general public. Because of limits on investor numbers or minimum investment amounts, hedge funds are normally open only to professional / institutional investors or high net worth individuals.
Mutual Funds typically go "long" the market and may not have much exposure to derivative contracts. But, hedge funds may be long or short the market and may use various derivative contracts. Thus, hedge funds pursue more complex investment strategies when compared to mutual funds.
But in recent times, the complexion of the hedge funds industry has been changing. Regulators are looking more closely at the sector than in the past due to the changing investor mix. Until recently, hedge funds mostly attracted the rich and super-wealthy. Today's hedge funds are increasingly monitored by professional managers at pension funds, endowments, foundations and even central banks. New investors are more demanding and, curiously enough risk-averse. This is forcing some hedge funds to change their investment style. A decade ago, investors wanted 30-50% returns. Now pension funds will settle for 8-10% returns[2], but want less volatility. Competition is also growing, as more traditional fund managers try to imitate the strategies of hedge funds.
It is estimated that 50-60%[3] of hedge-fund assets today come from institutions. Diversification is one reason motivating institutions to invest in hedge funds. Hedge funds have low correlations with other investments. Other advantages cited by institutions are the low volatility of hedge funds, their lack of correlation with economic cycles, and their greater risk taking predispostition.
Meanwhile, as hedge funds get bigger, the worry is that managers will become less entrepreneurial and more cautious. The distinction between mutual and hedge funds is also less clear than before. Mutual funds are acquiring hedge funds and pusuing some of their strategies, such as the use of leverage, short-selling and derivatives. For example, early in 2006, Schroders, an old British institution, decided to pursue a more aggressive investment style when it agreed to buy NewFinance Capital, a London fund of hedge funds[4]. Other big fund managers, including State Street Global Advisors and Goldman Sachs Asset Management, have also been trying to increase returns by using short-selling techniques. They are developing funds that will enable them to short-sell exposure to companies they do not like in an index. Both institutions would limit short-selling[5] to around 30% of a global portfolio, while keeping 130% long-only.
As short selling becomes more common, the distinction between mutual funds and hedge funds will get further blurred. In the US, mutual funds can sell short with some restrictions. In the European Union, recent changes in regulation allow fund managers to take short positions by using derivative instruments. As a result of all these changes, some traditional asset managers are planning to charge hedge fund-like fees to manage hedge fund-like products. Others charge like a hedge fund only when they beat their benchmarks. Because of all these options for investors, there is likely to be a paradigm shift. The exact impact of this shift, however, will be known only with time.
References
“The long and the short of it,” The Economist, 25th February 2006, pp 77-78.
“Growing pains,” The Economist, 4th March 2006, pp 63-66.
www.wikipedia.org
[1] “Growing pains,” The Economist, 4th March 2006, pp 63-66.
[2] “Growing pains,” The Economist, 4th March 2006, pp 63-66.
[3] “Growing pains,” The Economist, 4th March 2006, pp 63-66.
[4] “The long and the short of it,” The Economist, 25th February 2006, pp 77-78.
[5] “The long and the short of it,” The Economist, 25th February 2006, pp 77-78.
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